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FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AS AFFECTED
BY STATE STATUTES DEPRIVING STATE
COURTS OF JURISDICTION
Angel v. Bullingtoni
Plaintiff, Bullington, a citizen of Virginia came to the
North Carolina courts to recover a deficiency judgment on
a mortgage after default by defendant, Angel, a citizen
of North Carolina. The land, situated in Virginia, had
been sold to Angel by Bullington in 1940, and a series
of notes secured by a deed of trust on the land had been
given by the defendant to secure the balance of the pur-
chase price. Upon default, Bullington, acting under an
acceleration clause in the deed, caused the land to be sold
and the proceeds to be applied to the notes. Since a defi-
ciency remained, Bullington brought an action against
Angel in a North Carolina State court where he recovered
despite the defendant's contention that the North Carolina
law precluded recovery. On appeal by defendant, the
North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the trial court
and ordered the action dismissed, holding that the courts
of the State were deprived of jurisdiction to grant defi-
ciency judgments. The court based its view on a 1933
North Carolina statute providing: "In all sales of real
property by mortgagees and/or trustees under powers of
sale .. .the .. .holder of the notes secured by said mort-
gage or deed of trust shall not be entitled to a deficiency
judgment ..."2
Relying upon the holding of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina that the statute related "solely to the adjec-
tive law" of the State3 and that it hence served only to
limit the jurisdiction of the State courts but not to deprive
the plaintiff of any substantive rights, plaintiff did not
seek review of this decision in the Supreme Court of the
United States. Instead, he brought a new suit in the United
States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina where he recovered the judgment he had unsuc-
cessfully sought in the state courts. Both the District
Court4 and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth
1330 U. S. 183 (1947).
2 N. C. Gen. Stat. (1943) Sec. 45-36.
3 Bullington v. Angel, 220 N. C. 18, 16 S. E. (2d) 411 (1941).
1 Bullington v. Angel, 56 F. Supp. 372 (W. D. N. C. 1944).
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Circuit, which affirmed the judgment," rejected the defen-
dant's plea that the prior judgment of the state barred
recovery. The lower federal courts accepted at face value
the North Carolina Supreme Court's characterization of
the state statute as remedial and as not affecting the sub-
stantive rights of the parties. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari6 "because the failure to dismiss this action, on
the ground that the judgment in the North Carolina court
precluded the right thereafter to recover on the same cause
of action in the federal court, presented an important
question in the administration of justice." In a 6-3 decision
(Reed, Rutledge and Jackson, JJ., dissenting) the Supreme
Court reversed the judgment.7
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, held
that a federal district court sitting in North Carolina was
bound to follow state law and policy; that the state court's
characterization of the statute as remedial should not be
followed by the federal courts where to do so would result
in the federal courts giving "that which North Carolina
has withheld;" that the unappealed decision of the state's
highest court had necessarily involved a determination
of the constitutionality of the state statute; and that, since
another suit by plaintiff in the state courts would be barred
by res judicata, plaintiff's suit in a federal court sitting in
the same state is also barred by res judicata.
Through a combination of res judicata and Erie' doc-
trines the Court completely blocked the possibility that
Bullington might have a further hearing on the constitu-
tionality of the statute involved.9 It decided that Bull-
' Angel v. Bullington, 150 F. (2d) 679 (C3. C. A. 4th, 1945).
6 Angel v. Bullington, 326 U. S. 713 (1945).
7 Szpra, n. 1, 185.
8 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
9 It is quite likely, from the better view of the authorities on conflicts of
laws, that the state court's application of the statute so as to bar plain-
tiff's recovery was erroneous. The situs of the land was Virginia; the con-
tract was made in Virginia to be performed in Virginia; the only contact
with North Carolina was the fact that It was the forum and residence
of the defendant. The statute might well have been construed as applying
only to land in North Carolina, thus not precluding the application of
Virginia law by the North Carolina courts. See McGirl v. Brewer, 132 Ore.
422, 280 P. 508 (1929), on rehearing 285 P. 208 (1930) ; Felton v. West,
102 Cal. 266, 36 P. 676 (1894) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Aitkin, 125 N. Y.
660, 26 N. E. 732 (1891) ; and eases collected in 136 A. L. R. 1059. See also
STUMBEMG, CONFLICTS OF L&WS (1937) 351; and GooDaIcH, CONFLICT OF
LAws (2d ed. 1938) 402.
While perhaps erroneously applied, it is quite problematical whether
the statute was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff. There is a
great difference 'between saying (a) that a forum ought, by the better
view, to apply the law of a sister state which is the situs of a contract,
or (b) that the forum is compelled by the federal constitution to apply
that law. This latter was the question which Bullington originally raised
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ington, in failing to appeal the decision of the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court shutting him out of the North
Carolina courts, had chosen "not to continue to assert his
rights after an intermediate tribunal . .. decided against
him ... a For purposes of litigating the federal question
involved in the action brought in the state courts, the
North Carolina Supreme Court was an intermediate tri-
bunal. Even though this tribunal did not purport to decide
the "merits" of Bullington's claim, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
reasoned, it nevertheless refused on a so-called local ground
to enforce a claim based on an asserted federal right.
Hence its decision "concluded an adjudication of a federal
question even though it was not couched in those terms. ' ' "h
The Court reasoned next that the North Carolina statute
was expressive of a state policy against permitting recov-
ery of any deficiency judgments. Falling back upon the
rationale of the Erie and post-Erie cases to the effect that
a case in a federal court solely because of diversity of
citizenship must reach the same conclusion it would have
reached in the state courts, the Supreme Court decided
that the federal court in North Carolina should have re-
jected Bullington's suit on the grounds that it was identical
to one which had already been finally concluded in the
state courts.
It is not the purpose of this discussion to enter into a
consideration of the res judicata aspects of the majority
decision." Rather, the immediate object is to examine the
case in the light of the further indications it gives as to
in the state courts and which was now held to be res jadicata.. Perhaps
Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the majority had no qualms in thus cutting
off Bullington's chance for at least one "real bite at the apple of discord"
(Justice Rutledge's dissent) because they may have viewed plaintiff's
chances as very dim for convincing the Court that the Constitution compels
North Carolina to apply Virginia contract law.
Supra, n. 1, 189.
9b Ibid.
10 While the dissent of Justice Rutledge decried the majority opinion
as embodying a novel and unprecedented approach to the doctrine of res
judicacta and one which was not warranted by the facts of the case, it
appears that the result of the majority on this point-if not all of its
reasoning-is logical, although very harsh in its effect upon the plain-
tiff's case. Even though the state Supreme Court purported to rule only
upon a question of "jurisdiction" and not upon the "merits" of the case.
the majority view would seem technically correct. That is. where the
question of jurisdiction is whether a state may refuse to hear a cause
of action in its courts and where this involves a constitutional question,
then a ruling on the jurisdictional issue must involve adjudication of thQ
constitutional issue. The real hardship in the instant case-and the real
point to the dissenting opinions--is that Bullington had no reason to be
forewarned that the Supreme Court would arrive at such a combination
of Erie and res judiaota doctrines as to result in his being prevented from
having at least one full day in court.
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the scope and extent of the still expanding Erie doctrine,
with particular reference to the implications it has for the
jurisdiction of federal courts in diversity cases.
Perhaps the most significant result of the majority opin-
ion is the strong suggestion that a state may under some
circumstances validly close the doors not only of its own
courts, but also of the federal courts in that state to certain
types of litigation. As one more step in the post-Erie
development of the logical consequences of the doctrine of
uniformity of law within a state, the majority holding
would seem to render obsolete, or at least to qualify seri-
ously, the hitherto fundamental doctrine that a state cannot
limit or control the jurisdiction of the federal courts.1
It is ton years since the Court in the historic Erie case
decided that a federal court sitting in a diversity case may
not apply a "federal common law," but must apply the
law of the state. While the Erie case left to inference that
it was the "substantive" law of the state that the federal
court must apply and did not further define just what
would be included in this category for purposes of diver-
sity jurisdiction, subsequent cases have provided-and are
continuing to provide-the answers on a case-by-case basis.
These later cases have also provided a clearer picture of
the rationale of the Erie doctrine as now viewed by the
Court. In these cases such matters as burden of proof,' 2
public policy governing insurance contracts,' 3 state appli-
cations of conflicts of laws rules,'4 and statutes of limita-
tions barring equitable relief' 5 have been held to be "sub-
stantive" law which the federal courts must follow. Finally,
in the instant case, a state statute denying to all state
courts jurisdiction over a particular cause is, if consti-
tutional, likewise "substantive" for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction.
From this line of cases it has become clear that the
policy of the Court is to assure uniformity of outcome
within any given state-as far as legal rules affect the
outcome-of any case which is heard in a federal court
of that state because of diverse citizenship. The accidental
or fortuitous circumstance that one of the parties is a
" David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club, 225 U. S. 489 (1911);
Suydam v. Broadnax, 14 Pet. 67 (U. S. 1840).
"Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S. 208 (1939) (burden of proof
in attack on holder of legal title to land) ; Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S.
109 (1943) (burden of proving contributory negligence).
13 Griffin v. McOoach, 313 U. S. 498 (1941).
"Ibid.; Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941).
1" Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99 (1945).
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non-resident instead of a resident shall not result in any
different legal treatment in the federal forum than if
the cause were heard and decided in the state forum. Hence
the true test of whether a state rule of law is "substantive,"
and therefore to be followed by the federal court, is
whether failure to give effect to the state rule would
produce a "substantially different result. '16 In applying
this test the Court will, as it did in the Bullington case,
disregard the state court's characterization of a rule or
statute as "procedural," since the Erie policy is "so im-
portant to our federalism [that it] must be kept free
from entanglements with analytical or terminological
niceties."' 7
In the field of conflict of laws, public policy of a state
may be sufficiently strong to prohibit the enforcement
of foreign rights or the application of foreign law.'8 When
such is the case and such refusal is within the constitu-
tional power of the state, "it is for the state to say whether
[an asserted right or a rule of law] is so offensive to its
view of public welfare as to require its courts to close
their doors to its enforcement."' 9 And since "for purposes
of diversity jurisdiction a federal court is 'in effect, only
another court of the State' "20 the federal court must follow
state policy. While the North Carolina Supreme Court in
the Buflington case did not rest its decision as to the effec-
tiveness of the statutory withdrawal of jurisdiction on
public policy, it is clear that Mr. Justice Frankfurter
speaking for the Court's majority viewed the statute as
reflecting a state policy on behalf of debtors:
"The essence of diversity jurisdiction is that a
federal court enforces State law and State policy. If
North Carolina has authoritatively announced that de-
ficiency judgments cannot be secured within its
borders, it contradicts the pre-suppositions of diversity
jurisdiction for a federal court in that State to give
such a deficiency judgment. North Carolina would
hardly allow defeat of a State-wide policy through
occasional suits in a federal court."
21
16 Ibid.
17Ibid.; Sampson v. Channell, 110 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940)
Certiorari denied, 310 U. S. 650 (1940).
's No attempt is made to catalogue or illustrate here the variety of
cases which have been decided by State and Federal courts holding that
a State may refuse on grounds of public policy to recognize "foreign
rights".
10 Supra, n. 13, 507.
20 Supra, n. 1, 187 and gupra., n. 15, 108.
21 Supra, n. 1, 191.
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In arriving at its conclusion that North Carolina's with-
drawal of jurisdiction from the State courts also operated
as a rule for the federal court, the majority opinion found
it necessary to declare obsolete the holding of David Lup-
ton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club.2" This case had held
that a statute qualifying the rights of foreign corporations
to sue in the New York State courts did not affect the
rights of foreign corporations to sue in the federal courts
in New York. The statute in the Lupton case merely pre-
scribed conditions which must be met before a foreign
corporation might have the privilege of suing in the state
courts; it did not, as did the statute in the Bullington case,
deprive the state courts of all jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
the Court did not attempt to distinguish the earlier case,
but instead termed it "obsolete insofar as . . . based on a
view of diversity jurisdiction which came to an end with
[the] Erie [case]."
This language of the Court, together with the general
result of the case serves as a reminder that there may be
other types of state jurisdictional statutes which now
require application by the federal courts although they
were formerly thought to apply to the state courts only.
For example, it is conceivable that situations may arise
where forum non conveniens may be "substantive" from
the viewpoint of the Guaranty v. York test of "substantially
different result;" likewise the question may arise as to
state statutes which give jurisdiction over a certain cause
to a particular court. It is more difficult to see, however,
in these latter instances how a federal court's assumption
of jurisdiction would be likely to produce different legal
results; but perhaps the same statute might sometimes be
"substantive" and sometimes not. The further question
will undoubtedly also arise as to the effect of the expanded
Erie doctrine on the doctrine of equitable remedial rights
and generally on the equity jurisdiction of federal courts
sitting in diversity cases where the state has created new
remedies or limited the use of equitable remedies by statute
or by judicial decision.
Until the instant case it does not appear that any
federal court was persuaded that the Erie doctrine ex-
tended to the point where it might affect federal jurisdic-
tion in matters at law or in equity. On the contrary, it
seemed clear that the Erie doctrine was confined to mat-
ters of "substance" and not of jurisdiction, since to hold
otherwise seemed to lead to the illogical conclusion that
22 Supra, n. 11.
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the jurisdiction of federal courts may be controlled by act
of the state legislature or decision of the state courts. It
was stated in a case on which certiorari was denied by the
Supreme Court only a few years prior to the instant case
that a state may not determine the jurisdiction of a federal
court "under the theory that the latter is required to follow
the public policy of the former."23
However, the Bullington case seems to have opened up
a new vista for the application of individual State policy
and State law-namely, the possibility that in exercising
its freedom of declaring public policy a State may secure
some indirect measure of control over the jurisdiction of
the Federal courts. The implication seems plain that the
Supreme Court has not yet arrived at the outer boundaries
of application of the Erie doctrine.




The primary object of this case note is to consider the
impact of later Maryland decisions, namely, the Brooks and
Ritz cases, on existing Maryland amendment law as devel-
oped in an earlier case noted entitled, "Proper Venue of
Suit for Alimony Without Divorce-Ouster of Jurisdiction
-Amendment-Woodcock v. Woodcock."' The amend-
ment problem in the cases being noted was brought before
the courts by unsuccessful contentions that the "Thirty
Day Rules" of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City and
of Anne Arundel County providing, "No decree in a suit
for divorce shall be passed in less than thirty days from
the filing of the bill, or on the cross-bill within thirty days
from the filing of a cross-bill.. .,"I were violated.
The right to amend will be considered in the following
situations:
23 Stephenson v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 110 F. (2d) 401 (C. C. A.
7th, 1940) ; certiorari granted, 310 U. S. 632 (1940) ; certiorari dismissed,
311 U. S. 720 (1940).
1 184 Md. 419, 41 A. (2d) 367 (1945).
2 52 A. (2d) 729 (Md. 1947).
1 (1936) 1 Md. L. Rev. 81; 169 Md. 40, 179 A. 826 (1935).
4 Rules of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County (1936), Rule 26.
Rules of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, Rule 670.
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